Conspectus of Hegel’s
Science of Logic —
Book III (Subjective Logic or
the Doctrine of the Notion)

In the first two parts, says Hegel, I had
no Vorarbeiten,^[1] but here, on the other
hand, there is “verknöchertes Material”^[2]
(which it is necessary to “in Flüssigkeit brin-
gen”^[3]...) (3) ^[4]

“Being and Essence are the moments of
its becoming” (=des Begriffs).^[5] (5)

“Accordingly Objective Logic, which con-
siders Being and Essence, really constitutes
the genetic exposition of the Notion.” (6)

Passing to criticism of Kantian-
ism, Hegel regards as Kant’s great
merit (15) the advancement of the
idea of the “transcendental unity of
apperception” (the unity of the con-
sciousness in which the Begriff is cre-
ated), but he reproaches Kant for his
one-sidedness and subjec-
tivism:

“The object is truly in and for it-
self only as it is in thought; as it is in
intuition or ideation, it is appear-
ance....” (16) (Hegel raises Kant’s
idealism from being subjective to be-
ing objective and absolute)....

Kant admits the objectivity of con-
cepts (Wahrheit^[10] is their object),
but all the same leaves them subjective.

He makes Gefühl und Anschau-
ung^[11] precede Understanding. (Ver-
stand). Hegel speaks of this as
follows:

“Now, first, with regard to this relation
of the understanding or the Notion to the
stages which are supposed to precede it,
it is of importance what science it is that
is being treated, in order to determine the
form of these stages. In our science, since
it is pure logic, these stages are Being and
Essence. In psychology, sensation and in-
tuition and also ideation in general pre-
cede understanding. In the Phenomenology
of Mind, since it is the doctrine of con-
sciousness, the acsent was made through
the stages of sensuous consciousness and,
next, perception, to understanding.” (17)
In Kant the exposition is very “incom-
plete” here.

After that—the CHIEF THING—

...“The Notion must not here be
considered as an act of self-conscious
understanding, or as subjective under-
standing: what we have to do with

is the Notion in and for itself, which
constitutes a STAGE AS WELL OF

NATURE AS OF SPIRIT.  LIFE,
OR ORGANIC NATURE, IS
THAT STAGE OF NATURE AT
WHICH THE NOTION EMER-
GES.” (18)

There follows a very interesting passage
(pp. 19-27) where Hegel refutes Kant,
precisely epistemologically (Engels
probably had this passage in mind when he
wrote in Ludwig Feuerbach^[12] that the main
point against Kant had already been made
by Hegel, insofar as this was possible
from an idealistic standpoint),—exposing
Kant’s duality and inconsistency, his, so
to speak, vacillation between empiricism
(= materialism) and idealism, Hegel him-
self arguing wholly and exclu-
sively from the standpoint of a more
consistent idealism.

“‘It is only a notion’ is a thing com-
monly said; and not only the Idea, but sen-
suous, spatial, and temporally palpable
existence is opposed to the Notion, as
something which is more excellent than
it. And the abstract is counted of less
worth than the concrete, because from the
former so much, of that kind, of material
has been omitted. To those who hold this
view, the process of abstraction means that
for our subjective needs one or another
characteristic is taken out of the concrete in
such a manner that, while so many other
properties and modifications of the ob-
ject are omitted, it loses nothing in value

or dignity. They are the real and are reck-
oned as counting in full, only they are
left on the other side; and it is only the
incapacity of understanding to absorb such
riches that forces it to rest content with

meagre abstraction. But if the given ma-
terial of intuition and the manifold of
ideation are taken as the real in opposi-
tioh to that which is thought and to the

Notion, then this is a view the renuncia-
tion of which is not only a condition of
philosophy, but is assumed even by reli-
gion; for how can these be needed and
have significance if the fugitive and super-
ficial appearance of the sensuous and the in-
dividual are taken for the truth?.. Con-

sequently, abstracting thought must not
be considered as a mere setting-aside of
the sensuous material, whose reality is
said not to be lowered thereby; but it is
its transcendence, and the reduction of it
(as mere appearance) to the essential, which
manifests itself in the Notion only.” (19-21)

“A principal misapprehension here is
that the natural principle or the beginning,
which is the starting-point in natural de-
velopment or in the history of the individ-
ual in its formation, is taken as the true
and as that which is first also in the No-
tion.” (21) (—It is correct that people
begin with that, but truth lies not in
the beginning but in the end, or rather,
in the continuation. Truth is not the ini-
tial impression).... “But philosophy is not
meant to be a narrative of what happens,
but the cognition of what is true in happen-
ings.” (21)

In Kant there is “psychological ideal-
ism” (22): Kant's categories “are only
determinations which are derived from self-
consciousness.” (22) Rising from under-
standing (Verstand) to Reason (Vernunft),
Kant belittles the significance of thought,
denying is the capacity to “reach perfected
truth.” (23)

“It is declared” (Kant) “to be an abuse if
logic, which ought to be merely a canon
of judgment, is regarded as an organ for
the production of objective discoveries. The
notions of Reason, in which a higher

force (an idealistic phrase!) and a deeper
(correct!!) content were of necessity
divined, are less Konstitutives^[13] |it should
be: Objektives^[14]| than even the categories;
they are mere ideas. Their use may cer-
tainly be permissible, but these intelligible

essences, which should wholly unlock the
truth, are to signify no more than hypothe-
ses; and it would be completely arbitrary
and reckless to ascribe any truth to them
in and for themselves, since they can occur
in no kind of experience. Could it ever
have been thought that philosophy would
gainsay the validity of the intelligible essences
because they are without the spatial and
temporal material of sensuousness?” (23)

Kant, on the other hand, quite clearly recog-
nises the “objectivity” (24) of thought
(“des Denkens”) (“an identity of the Notion
and the thing” (24))—but, on the other hand,

“the assertion is made again that we sure-
ly cannot know things as they are in and
for themselves, and that truth does not
allow cognising reason to approach it; that
truth which consists in the unity of object
and Nation is after all only appearance, and

the reason now is that content is only the
manifold of intuition. Of this argument it
has been remarked that this manifoldness,
insofar as it belongs to intuition as op-
posed to the Notion, is transcended precisely
in the Notion, and that the object is led back

by the Notion into its non-contingent essen-
tiality; the latter enters into appearance,
and for this very reason the appearance is
mamfestatlon not merely non-essential, but
manifestation of Essence.” (24, 25)

“It will always remain a matter for aston-
ishment how the Kantian philosophy knew
that relation of thought to sensuous exist-
ence, where it halted, for a merely rela-
tive relation of bare appearance, and fully
acknowledged and asserted a higher unity
of the two in the Idea in general, and, for
example, in the idea of an intuitive under-
standing; but yet stopped dead at this rel-

ative relation and at the assertion that the
Notion is and remains utterly separated

from reality;—so that it affirmed as truth
what it pronounced to be finite knowledge,
and declared to be superfluous, improper,
and figments of thought that which it
recognised as truth, and of which it estab-
lished the definite notion” (26)

In logic, the Idea “becomes the creator
of Nature.” (26)

Logic is “formelle Wissenschaft”^[17] (27)
as against the concrete sciences (of nature
and mind), but its object matter is “die
reine Warheit”^[18]....(27)

Kant himself, in asking what truth is (27)
(the Critique of Pure Reason p. 83) and
giving a trivial answer (“correspondence
of knowledge with its object”), strikes at
himself, for “the fundamental assertion
of transcendental idealism” is
     —that “cognition is not capable of appre-
hending Things-in-themselves”(27)—
     —and it is clear that all this is “an
untrue idea.” (28)

In arguing against the purely formal con-
ception of logic (which Kant, too, is said
to have)—saying that from the ordinary
standpoint (truth is the correspondence
|“Übereinstimmung”| of knowledge with
the object) correspondence “essentially de-
mands two sides” (29), Hegel says that the
formal element in logic is “pure truth” (29)
and that

...“this formal element must therefore
be thought of as being in itself much richer
in determinations and content, and as hav-
ing infinitely more influence upon the
concrete, than it is generally held to have....
(29)

...“But, even if the logical forms are to
be regarded as nothing more than formal
functions of thought, yet this character
would make them worthy of an investi-
gation as to how far they correspond to
the truth in themselves. A system of logic
which neglects this can claim at most
to have the value of a natural-historical
description of the empirical phenomena of
thought.” (30-31) (Herein is said to lie

the immortal merit of Aristotle), but “it
is necessary to go further....” (31)

Cf. Encyclopaedia, Vol. VI, p. 319 ^[19]:
“But in point of fact they” (die logischen
Formen^[20]), “turned round as forms of the
notion, constitute the living spirit of the
actual....”

Begriff in its development into “adäquaten

Begriff,”^[21] becomes the Idea. (33)^[22]
“Notion in its objectivity is the object
which is in and for itself.” (33)

The dialectical movement of the “No-
tion”—from the purely “formal” notion
at the beginning—to the Judgement (Urteil),
then—to the Syllogism (Schluß) and—fi-
nally to the transformation of the subjectiv-
ity of the Notion into its objectivity.
(34-35)^[23]

The first distinguishing feature of the
Notion is Universaltity (Allegemeinheit). NB:
The Notion grew out of Essence, and the
latter out of Being.

The further development of the Uni-
versal, the Particular (Besonderes) and the
Individual (Einzelnes) is in the highest
degree abstract and “abstruse.”

The further development of the Uni-
versal, the Particular (Besonderes) and the
Individual (Einzelnes) is in the highest
degree abstract and “abstruse.”

Voilà an
abundance of
“determina-
tions” and of
Begriffsbe-
stimmungen^[26]
in this part
of the Logic!

Quoting, on p. 125, the “famous” syllo-
gism—“all men are mortal, Gaius is a man,
therefore he is mortal”—Hegel shrewdly

adds: “Boredom immediately descends when
such a syllogism is heard approaching”—
this is declared to be due to the “unnützen

Form,”^[27] and Hegel makes the profound
remark:

“All things are a Syllogism, a universal
which is bound together with individuality
through particularity; but of course they
are not wholes consisting of three propo-
sitions.” (126)

Inter alia:
     “Kant’s Antinomies of Reason are just
this, that first one determination of a No-
tion is made the foundation of the Notion,
and next, and with equal necessity,
the other....” (128-129)

Two aphorisms:

1. Plekhanov criticises Kantianism (and
agnosticism in general) more from a vul-
gar-materialistic standpoint than from a
dialectical-materialistic standpoint, inso-
far as he merely rejects their views a li-
mine,^[34] but does not correct them (as He-
gel corrected Kant), deepening, generalis-
ing and extending them, showing the
connection and transitions of
each and every concept.

2. Marxists criticised (at the beginning
of the twentieth century) the Kantians
and Humists more in the manner of Feuer-
bach (and Büchner) than of Hegel.

...“An experience which rests upon in-
duction is taken as valid although admitted-
ly the perception is not completed; but no
more can be assumed than that no example
can be produced contrary to this experience,
insofar as the latter is true in and for
itself.” (154)

The transition from the syllogism
of analogy (about analogy) to the syllogism
of necessity,—from the syllogism of induc-
tion to the syllogism of analogy,—the
syllogism of the universal to the individ-
ual—the syllogism^[35] from the individual
to the universal,—the exposition of con-
nection and transitions |con-
nection is transition|, that is Hegel’s

task. Hegel actually proved that
logical forms and laws are not an empty
shell, but the reflection of the objec-

tive world. More correctly, he did not
prove, but made a brilliant guess.

In the Encyclopaedia Hegel re-
marks that the division of Understanding
and Reason, of Notions of one kind or
the other must be understood in such a way
     “that our mode of behaviour is either

to stop short at the merely negative and
abstract form of the Notion, or to conceive
the latter, in accordance with its true

nature, as that which is at once positive

and concrete. Thus, for example, if freedom
is regarded as the abstract opposite of ne-
cessity, this is merely the Notion of under-
standing of freedom, whereas the true and
rational Notion of freedom contains ne-
cessity as transcended within it.” (Pp. 347-
348), Vol. VI^[36])

Ibidem p. 349: Aristotle described the
logical forms so completely that “essen-
tially” there has been nothing to add.

Usually the “figures of the syllogism”
are regarded as empty formalism. “They”
(these figures) “have, however, a very fun-
damental meaning, based on the necessity
that every moment, as determination of
the Notion, itself becomes the whole and
mediating Ground.” (352, Vol. VI)

Encyclopaedia (Vol. VI, pp. 353-354)

“The objective meaning of the figures
of the syllogism is in general that every-
thing rational is manifested as a threefold
syllogism, such that each of its members
assumes the position of one of the extremes

as well as that of the mediating middle.
Such, for example, is the case with the three
branches of philosophy, i. e., the Logical

Idea, Nature and Mind. Here it is Nature
that is first of all the middle, connecting
member. Nature, this immediate totality,
unfolds itself in the two extremes of the

Logical Idea and Mind.”^[37]

+ “Spirit, however, is only spirit through
being mediated by Nature.... ”It is Spirit
that recognises the logical Idea in Nature

and so raises it to its essence....” “The
logical Idea is ‘the absolute Substance
both of Spirit and of Nature, the universal,
the all-pervading.’” (353-354)

In regard to analogy an acute observation:

“It is the instinct of reason which allows
one to divine that one or another empiri-
cally found determination has its roots in
the inner nature or genus, of an object,
and which bases itself further on this de-
termination.” (357) (VoL VI, p. 359)

In ordinary logic^[38] thought is formal-
istically divorced from objectivity.

“Thought is held here to be a mere sub-
jective and formal activity, and what is
objective is held to be, in contrast to
thought, something firm and present for
itself. This dualism, however, is not the
truth, and it is thoughtless procedure to
accept the determinations of subjectivity
and objectivity in this way without fur-
ther question, and without inquiring into
their origin....” (359-360) In reality, sub-
jectivity is only a stage of development
from Being and Essence—whereupon this
subjectivity “dialectically ‘breaks through
its barrier’” and “opens out into objectiv-
ity by means of the syllogism.” (360)

Vol. VI, p. 360
     “The realised Notion” is the object.

This transition from the subject, from
the notion, to the object is said to seem
“strange,” but by the object one should
understand not simply Being, but some-
thing definitive, “something independent,
concrete and complete in itself....” (361)
“The world is the other being of the Idea.”

Subjectivity (or the Notion) and the
object—are the same and not the same....
(362).

...“It is wrong to regard subjectivity and
objectivity as a fixed and abstract antithe-
sis. Both are wholly dialectical....” (367)

(Logic) V, 178:^[39]
     The twofold significance of objectivity:
...“similarly a twofold significance appears
for Objectivity: it stands opposed to the in-
dependent Notion, but also is that which

is in and for itself....” (178)

...“The knowledge of truth is placed in
the cognition of the object as object without
the addition of any subjective reflection...”
(178)

The paragraph entitled “Law” (198-199)
does not give what could be expected
from Hegel on such an interesting question.
It is strange why “law” is referred to “mech-
anism”?

The concept of law approximates
here the concepts “order” (Ordnung);
uniformity (Gleichförmigkeit); necessi-

ty; the “soul” der objektiven Totalität;^[40]
the “principle of self-movement.”

To be noted: on p. 210 the concept of

“Naturnotwendigkeit”^[41] is encountered—
“both mechanism and Chemism are, then,
comprehended under natural necessity”...
for we see here “its” (des Begriffs) “submer-

((( sion into externality” (ibidem).     ))

“It was mentioned that the opposition be-
tween Teleology and Mechanism is, in the
first instance, the more general opposition
between freedom and necessity. Kant sets

out the opposition in this form under the
Antinomies of Reason, as the ‘Third Con-
flict of Transcendental Ideas.’” (213) Briefly
repeating Kant’s proofs, thesis and antith-
esis, Hegel notes the hollowness of these
proofs and directs attention to the result
of Kant’s considerations:

Kant’s solution of this Antinomy is
the same as the general solution of the
others: that reason can prove neither of
these propositions, since we can have no
determinant principle a priori about the pos-
sibility of things according to mere empirical

laws of nature; consequently the two must

not be regarded as objective prop-
ositions but as subjective maxims;

on the one hand I ought always to reflect
upon all natural events according to the
principle of pure natural mechanism; but

this does" not prevent me from investigat-
ing certain forms of nature, should the
occasion be given, according to another

maxim, namely, that of final causes;—as
though these two maxims (which further
are supposed to be required only by human
reason) were not in the same opposition
in which the propositions stand.—As was

observed above, from this whole standpoint
the only question which is demanded by
philosophic interest is not looked into,
namely, which of these two principles is
true in and for itself; but, for this point

of view, it is irrelevant whether the prin-
ciples are to be considered as objective de-
terminations of nature (that is here, as de-
terminations existing externally) or as mere
maxims of a subjective cognition.—But
in fact this is a subjective, that is, a
contingent, cognition, which applies
one or the other maxim as the occasion
may suggest according to whether it thinks
it appropriate to the given objects, but
otherwise does not ask about the truth
of these determinations themselves, wheth-
er both are determinations of the objects
or of cognition.” (215-216)

“The End has turned out
to be the third term with
respect to Mechanism and
Chemism; it is their truth.
Since it still stands within
the sphere of Objectivity or
of the immediacy of the to-
tal Notion, it is still affec-
ted by externality as such;
an objective world to which
it relates itself still stands
opposed to it. From this
side mechanical causality
(in which generally Chem-
ism must be included)
still appears in this End-
relation (which is external),
but as subordinated to it
and as transcended in and
for itself.” (216-217)

...“From this results the
nature of the subordination
of the two previous forms
of the objective process: the
Other, which in them lies
in the infinite progress, is
the Notion which at first
is posited as external to
them, which is End; not
only is the Notion their
substance, but also exter-
nality is the moment which
is essential to them and con-
stitutes their determinate-

”The laws of the external
world, of nature, which are
divided into mechanical
and chemical (this is very
important) are the bases of
man’s purposive activity.

In his practical activity,
man is confronted with the
objective world, is depend-
ent on it, and determines
his activity by it.

From this aspect, from
the aspect of the practical
(purposive) activity of man,
the mechanical (and chemi-
cal) causality of the world
(of nature) appears as though
something external, as
though something secon-
dary, as though something
hidden.

Two forms of the ob-
jective process: nature
(mechanical and chemical)
and the purposive ac-
tivity of man. The mutual
relation of these forms. At
the beginning, man’s ends
appear foreign (“other”) in
relation to nature. Human
consciousness, science (“der

ness. Thus mechanical or
chemical technique sponta-
neously offers itself to the
End-relation by reason of
its character of being deter-
mined externally; and this
relation must now be
further considered.” (217)

Begriff”), reflects the essence,
the substance of nature,
but at the same time this
consciousness is something
external in relation to na-
ture (not immediately, not
simply, coinciding with it).

MECHANICAL  AND
CHEMICAL TECHNIQUE
serves human ends just be-

cause its character (essence)
consists in its being deter-
mined by external condi-
tions (the laws of nature).

...“It” (der Zweck^[42]) “has before it an
objective, Mechanical and Chemical world,
to which its activity relates itself as to
something already given....” (219-220) “To
this extent it still has a truly extra-
mundane existence, namely, insofar as
this objectivity stands opposed to it....”
(220)

“The End binds itself with objectivity
through a Means, and in objectivity with
itself.” (221 §: “The Means.”)

Further, since the End is finite it has
a finite content; accordingly it is not
absolute or utterly in and for itself reason-
able. The Means however is the external
middle of the syllogism which is the realisa-
tion of the End; in it therefore reason-
ableness manifests itself as such—as pre-
serving itself in this external Other and
precisely through this externality. To that
extent the Means is higher than the finite
Ends of external usefulness: the plough
is more honourable than those immediate
enjoyments which are procured by it, and
serve as Ends. The instrument is preserved,
while the immediate enjoyments pass away

and are forgotten. IN HIS TOOLS MAN
POSSESSES POWER OVER EXTERNAL
NATURE. ALTHOUGH AS REGARDS
HIS ENDS, HE FREQUENTLY IS SUB-
JECTED TO IT.” (226)

When Hegel endeavours—sometimes
even huffs and puffs—to bring man’s
purposive activity under the categories
of logic, saying that this activity
is the “syllogism” (Schluß), that the
subject (man) plays the role of a “mem-
ber” in the logical “figure” of the

“syllogism,” and so on—THEN THAT
IS NOT MERELY STRETCHING A
POINT, A MERE GAME. THIS HAS
A VERY PROFOUND, PURELY MA-
TERIALISTIC CONTENT. IT HAS TO
BE INVERTED: THE PRACTICAL
ACTIVITY OF MAN HAD TO LEAD
HIS CONSCIOUSNESS TO THE REPE-

TITION OF THE VARIOUS LOGICAL
FIGURES THOUSANDS OF MILLIONS
OF TIMES  IN ORDER THAT
THESE FIGURES COULD OBTAIN
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF AXIOMS.
THIS NOTA BENE.

“The movement of the End has now
achieved that the moment of externality
is posited not only in the Notion, and
the Notion is not only Ought and tendency,
but, as concrete totality, is identical

with immediate Objectivity.” (235) At the
end of the § on “The Realised End,” at the
end of the section (Chapter III: “Te-
leology”)—of Section II: “Objectivi-
ty,” the transition to Section III: “The
Idea.”

The beginning of Section III: “The Idea”

“The Idea is the adequate Notion: ob-
jective truth, or the truth as
such.” (236)

In general, the introduction to Section III
(“The Idea”) of Part II to the Logic
(“Subjective Logic”) (Volume V, pp.236-
243) and the corresponding §§ of the

Encyclopaedia (§§ 213-215)—ARE PER-
HAPS THE BEST EXPOSITION OF
DIALECTICS. Here too, the coincidence,

so to speak, of logic and epistemology is
shown in a remarkable brilliant way.

The expression “Idea” is used also in
the sense of a simple representation.
Kant.

“Kant has claimed the expression idea
again for the Notion of reason. Now accord-

ing to Kant the Notion of reason is to be

the Notion of the unconditioned, and, with
respect to phenomena, to be transcen-
dental, which means that it is impossible
to make any adequate empirical use of
it. Notions of reason (according to Kant)
are to serve for the conceptual compre-
hension, and Notions of understanding
for the bare understanding, of percep-
tions. But, in fact, if the latter really

are Notions then they are Notions,—con

ceptual comprehension takes place through
them....” (236)

It is equally incorrect to regard the Idea
as something “unreal”—as people say: “it
is merely an idea.”

If thoughts are merely subjective and
contingent they certainly have no further
value; but in this they are not inferior
to temporal and contingent actualities,
which also have no further value except that

which is proper to contingencies and phe-
nomena. And if conversely the Idea is not
to be rated as true because, with respect
to phenomena, it is transcendental, and no
object can be assigned to it, in the sen-
suous world, coinciding with it, this
is a strange lack of understanding,—for
so the Idea is denied objective validity
because it lacks that which constitutes
appearance, or the untrue being of the ob-
jective world.” (237-238)

In relation to practical ideas, Kant him-
self admits that the appeal to experience
against ideas is pöbelhaft^[43]: he holds ideas
as a Maximum to which one should endeav-
our to bring actuality closer. And Hegel
continues:
     “But, the result having been reached that
the Idea is the unity of the Notion and
Objectivity, the truth, it must not merely
be considered as a goal which must be

approached while it still remains a kind
of beyond; it must be held that whatever
is actual is only insofar as it contains
and expresses the Idea. The object, and

the objective and subjective world, not

merely ought to conform to the Idea, but
are themselves the conformity of Notion
and reality; that reality which does not
correspond to the Notion is mere appear-
ance, or that subjective, contingent, ca-
pricious entity which is not the truth.” (238)

“It” (die Idee) “is,  first,
simple truth, the identity
of the Notion and Objec-
tivity as a universal....
(242)

...“Secondly, it is the re-
lation of the Subjectivity,
which is for itself, of the
simple Notion to its Ob-
jectivity which is distinct
from it, the former is es-
sentially the impulse to tran-
scend this separation....

...“As this relation, the
Idea is the process in which
it sunders itself into in-
dividuality and its inor-
ganic nature, and again
brings the latter back un-
der the power of the sub-
ject, returning to the first
simple universality. The
self-identity of the Idea is
one with the process; and
the thought which frees ac-
tuality from the semblance
of purposeless changeabili-
ty and transfigures it into
the Idea must not imagine
this truth of actuality as
a dead repose or bare pic-
ture, matt, without im-
pulse or motion, or as a gen-
ius, number, or abstract
thought. In the Idea the
Notion reaches freedom, and
because of this the Idea
contains also the harshest

The idea (read: man’s
knowledge) is the coinci-
dence (conformity) of no-
tion and objectivity (the
“universal”). This—first.

Secondly, the idea is the
relation of the subjectiv-
ity (= man) which is for
itself (= independent, as it
were) to the objectivity
which is distinct (from
this Idea)....

Subjectivity is the im-
pulse to destroy this sepa-
ration (of the idea from
the object).
     Cognition is the process
of the submersion (of
the mind) in an inorganic
nature for the sake of
subordinating it to the
power of the subject and
for the sake of gener-
alisation (cognition of the
universal in its phenome-
na)....
     The coincidence of
thought with the object is a
process: thought (= man)
must not imagine truth in
the form of dead repose,
in the form of a bare pic-
ture (image), pale (matt),
without impulse, without
motion, like a genus, like
a number, like abstract
thought.
     The idea contains also

opposition; its repose con-
sists in the security and
certainty with which it eter-
nally creates and eternally
overcomes it, coinciding in
it with itself.”

the strongest contradiction,
repose (for man’s thought)
consists in the firmness and
certainty with which he
eternally creates (this con-
tradiction between thought

and object) and eternally
overcomes it....
 

Cognition is the eternal, endless
approximation of thought to the ob-
ject. The reflection of nature in man’s
thought must be understood not “life-
lessly,” not “abstractly,” not dev-
oid of movement, not with-
out contradictions, but in the
eternal process of movement, the aris-
ing of contradictions and their solution.

“The Idea is ... the Idea
of the True and of the
Good, as Cognition and Vo-
lition.... The process of this
finite cognition and (NB)
action (NB) makes the
universality, which at first
is abstract, into a totali-
ty, whence it becomes per-
fected objectivity.” (243)

The idea is Cognition and
aspiration (volition) [of
man]... The process of (tran-
sitory, finite, limited) cog-
nition and action converts
abstract concepts into per-
fected objectivity.

Also in the Encyclo-
paedia (Vol. VI).^[45] En-
cyclopaedia § 213
(p. 385)

...“The Idea is truth,
for truth is the correspond-
ence of objectivity with
the Notion.... But also
everything actual, insofar
as it is true, is the Idea...
The individual Being is
some one aspect of the
Idea; hence it requires also
other actualities, which
likewise appear as existing
specially for themselves; it
is only in all of them to-
gether and in their rela-
tion that) the Notion is
realised. The individual by
itself does not correspond
to its Notion; this limi-
tation of its determinate
existence constitutes its fi-
nitude and its downfall....”

Individual Being (an ob-
ject, a phenomenon, etc.)
is (only) one side of the
Idea (of truth). () Truth re-
quires still other sides of
reality, which likewise ap-
pear only as independent
and individual (besonders
für sich bestehende^[46]).
Only in their to-
tality, (zusammen), and
in their relation (Be-
ziehung) is truth realised.

(The totality of all sides of the
phenomenon, of reality and their (re-
ciprocal) relations—that is what
truth is composed of. The relations
(= transitions = contradictions) of
notions = the main content of logic,
by which these concepts (and their
relations, transitions, contradictions)
are shown as reflections of the objec-
tive world. The dialectics of things
produces the dialectics of ideas, and
not vice versa.)

# This aphorism should be expressed
more popularly, without the word dia-
lectics: approximately as follows: In
the alternation, reciprocal dependence
of all notions, in the identity of their
opposites, in the transitions of one no-
tion into another, in the eternal change,
movement of notions, Hegel brilliantly
divined PRECISELY THIS RELA-
TION OF THINGS, OF NATURE.

=......................
mutual dependence of notions
    ”           ”     all        ”
       without exception
transitions of notions from
                     one into another
    ”          all         ”    without
                                exception.

The relativity of opposition between notions...
the identity of opposites between notions.

“Truth is first of all taken to mean
that I know how something is. This is
truth, however, only in reference to con-
sciousness, or formal truth, bare correct-
ness. (§ 213, 386) Truth in the deeper
sense, on the contrary; consists in the
identity between objectivity and the
Notion....

“A bad man is an untrue man, i.e.,
a man who does not behave in confor-
mity with the notion of him, or his posi-
tion. Nothing, however, can exist entire-
ly devoid of identity between the no-
tion and reality. Even what is bad and
untrue has being only insofar as its real-
ity still, somehow, conforms to its no-
tion....

...“Everything deserving the name of
philosophy has always been based on
the consciousness of an absolute unity
of that which the understanding
accepts as valid only in its sep-
aration....”

“The stages of Being and Essence hith-
erto considered, as well as those of No-
tion and of Objectivity, are not, when so
distinguished, something permanent,
resting upon themselves. But they have
proved to be dialectical, and their truth con-
sists only in being moments of the
idea.” (387-388)

Vol. VI, p. 388 (§ 214):

“The Idea may be described in many
ways. It may be called reason (this is the
proper philosophical signification of rea-
son); also subject-object; the unity of the
ideal and the real, of the finite and the
infinite, of soul and body; the possibility
which has its actuality in its own self;
that whose nature can be conceived only
as existent, etc. All these descriptions

apply, because the Idea contains all the
relations of understanding; but contains
them in their infinite self-return and self-

identity.

“It is easy work for the understanding to
show that everything said of the Idea is
self-contradictory. But that can quite as well
be rendered to the understanding or rather
it is already accomplished in the idea. And
this work, which is the work of reason, is
certainly not so easy as that of the under-
standing.—The understanding may demon-
strate that the Idea is self-contradictory,
because, for instance, the subjective is
only subjective and is always confronted
by the objective; that Being is something
quite different from the notion and there-
fore cannot be extracted out of it; and that
likewise the finite is only finite and the

exact antithesis of the infinite, and there-
fore not identical with it; and so on with
all the determinations. Logic, however,
demonstrates the opposite of all this, name-

ly, that the subjective, which is to be
subjective only, the finite, which is to be
finite only, the infinite, which is to be
infinite only, and so on, have no truth,
but contradict themselves, and pass into
their opposites. Thus, this transition, and
the unity in which the extremes are in-
cluded as transcended, as appearance or
moments, is revealed as their truth. (388)

“The understanding, when it tackles the
Idea, falls into a double misunderstand-

ing. First, it takes the extremes of the
Idea (be they expressed as they will, so
long as they are in their unity) still in
that sense and determination in which

they are not in their concrete unity, but

remain abstractions outside of the Idea.
“It” (der Verstand^[47]) “no less mistakes the
relation between them, even when it has

been expressly stated; thus, for example, it over-
looks even the nature of the copula
in the judgment, which affirms that
the individual, the subject, is just as
much not individual, but uni-
versal.—In the second place, the understand-

ing believes its reflection,—that the self-indent-
ical Idea contains its own negative, the
contradiction,—to be an external reflec-
tion which does not lie within the Idea itself.
In fact, however, this is not the understand-
ing’s own wisdom. The Idea itself
is the dialectic which for ever sepa-

rates and distinguishes the self-identical
from the differentiated, the subjective from

the objective, the finite from the infinite, the soul
from the body. Only insofar is it an eter-
nal creation, eternal vitality,
and eternal spirit....” (389)

VI, § 215, p. 390:

The Idea is essentially a process, be-
cause its identity is the absolute and free
identity of the notion, only insofar as
it is absolute negativity and for that
reason dialectical.”

Hence, Hegel says, the expression “uni-
ty” of thinking and being, of finite and
infinite, etc., is falsch,^[48] because it ex-
presses “quietly persisting identity.” It is
not true that the finite simply neutral-
ises (“netralisiert”) the infinite and vice
versa. Actually, we have a process.

If one calculates ... every second more
than ten persons in the world die, and
still more are born. “Movement” and “mo-
ment”: catch it. At every given moment
... catch this moment. Idem in simple
mechanical motion (contra Chernov).^[49]

“The idea as a process runs through
three stages in its development. The first
form of the idea is Life.... The second form
is ... the idea in the form of Knowledge,
which appears under the double aspect
of the theoretical and practical idea. The
process of knowledge results in the resto-
ration of unity enriched by difference,
and this gives the third form, that of
the Absolute Idea...” (391)

Logic. Volume V.

Section Three: Idea. Chapter I. Life.

The question of Life does not belong to
“logic as it is commonly imagined.” (Bd.
V. p. 244^[50]) If, however, the subject-mat-
ter of logic is truth, and “truth as
such wesentlich im Erkennen
ist,^[51]” then cognition has to be dealt
with—in connection with cognition it is
already (p. 245) necessary to speak of
life.

Sometimes so-called “pure logic” is fol-
lowed by “applied” (angewandte) logic, but
then...

...“every science must be absorbed in
logic, since each is an applied logic in-
sofar as it consists in apprehending its
object in forms of thought and of the
Notion.” (244)

Subdivisions:^[53]
1) Life, as “the living individual” (§ A)
2) “The Life-process”
3) “The Process of Kind” (Gattung), re-
     production of man, and transition to
     cognition.

Or again, reproduction of
man ... “is their” (of two
individuals of different sex)
“realised identity, is the
negative unity of the kind
which intro-reflects itself
out of the division....” (261)

...“Its” (des Begriffs^[55]) “reality in gener-
al is the form of its determinate existence,
and what matters is the determination
of this form; upon this depends the
distinction of that which the Notion is in
itself or as subjective, and of what it is
as submerged into Objectivity, and next
in the Idea of Life.” (263)

...“Spirit not only is infi-
nitely richer than Nature,
but the absolute unity of
opposites in the Notion con-
stitutes its essence....” (264)

In Kant “the Ego” is as a transcenden-
tal subject of thoughts” (264); “At the
same time this Ego, according to Kant’s
own expression, is awkward in this respect,

that we must always make use of it in
order to make any judgment about it....”
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(p. 265)

“In his” (= Kant’s) “criticism of these
determinations” (namely: abstrakte ein-

seitige Bestimmungen “der vormaligen—
pre-Kantian—Metaphysik”^[56] concerning the
“soul”) “he” (Kant) “simply followed Hume’s
sceptical manner: holds fast to that which
appears as Ego in self-consciousness, from

which however everything empirical must
be omitted, since the aim is to know its
essence, or the Thing-in-itself. Now noth-
ing remains but the phenomenon of the
I think which accompanies every idea;
and nobody has the slightest notion of this
‘I think.’” (266) # # #